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Gerhard Will 
China und Vietnam 
Möglichkeiten und Hindernisse der bilateralen Zusammenarbeit 
Bericht des BIOst Nr. 24/1998 
Kurzfassung 
Vorbemerkung 
Die chinesisch-vietnamesischen Beziehungen bieten seit einigen Jahren ein sehr widersprüch-
liches Erscheinungsbild. Trotz ständig wiederholter Freundschaftsbeteuerungen, einem dich-
ten Austausch von Delegationen auf allen Ebenen und stark angewachsenen Handelsbezie-
hungen, beschuldigen sich beide Seiten in öffentlichen und sehr scharf formulierten Erklärun-
gen gegenseitig der Verletzung der territorialen Integrität. Einige Beobachter haben daraus 
bereits den Schluß gezogen, daß längerfristig eine erneute militärische Auseinandersetzung 
zwischen beiden Ländern wohl unvermeidbar und der Ausgangspunkt für einen großangeleg-
ten militärischen Konflikt in Südostasien sein werde. Ziel der vorliegenden Arbeit ist es, 
durch eine eingehendere Analyse der Kooperations- und Konfliktpotentiale sowie der von 
beiden Parteien verfolgten Konfliktstrategien zu einer fundierteren Einschätzung dieses 
bilateralen Verhältnisses zu gelangen. 
Der Bericht basiert vorwiegend auf der Auswertung regierungsamtlicher Verlautbarungen so-
wie publizistischer Kommentare aus der VR China und der SR Vietnam. Berichte und Artikel 
internationaler Zeitungen und Zeitschriften wurden als Hintergrundinformationen herange-
zogen. 
Ergebnisse 
1. Während der zweiten Hälfte der siebziger Jahre hatte Vietnams Politik, die auf ein enges 
Bündnis mit der Sowjetunion und auf die Errichtung einer Vormachtstellung in Indochina 
abzielte, zu einem offenen Konflikt mit der VR China und zu einem wirtschaftlichen Nie-
dergang Vietnams geführt. Bei der Suche nach einem Ausweg aus der wirtschaftlichen 
Krise bediente sich Hanoi, wie schon so oft in der Geschichte Vietnams, des chinesischen 
Vorbilds; in diesem Falle der in der VR China seit 1978 eingeleiteten Wirtschaftsrefor-
men. Wenige Jahre später machten schließlich der bedingungslose Abzug der vietnamesi-
schen Truppen aus Kambodscha, Hanois konstruktive Mitarbeit an einer internationalen 
Vereinbarung zur Regelung des Kambodschakonflikts und nicht zuletzt die chinesisch-so-
wjetische Aussöhnung den Weg frei für eine Normalisierung der chinesisch-vietnamesi-
schen Beziehungen. 
2. Der Zusammenbruch des Sozialismus in Osteuropa und der Sowjetunion führte China und 
Vietnam noch enger zusammen. In Hanoi wie in Peking zog man aus diesem historischen 
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Ereignis die Schlußfolgerung, daß der Sozialismus in diesen Ländern deshalb gescheitert 
sei, weil wirtschaftliche Reformen zu spät und zu zaghaft, politische Reformen aber zu 
übereilt und zu weitgehend vorgenommen worden seien. Gerade in Zeiten 
wirtschaftlicher Reformen, die eine Ausweitung des privaten Wirtschaftssektors 
beinhalten, müsse jedoch das Herrschaftsmonopol der Partei um so entschiedener 
verteidigt werden. 
3. In Erklärungen beider Partei- und Staatsführungen wird denn auch immer wieder betont, 
daß man gerade in der Frage der politischen Führung und Herrschaftsausübung voneinan-
der lernen könne und daher den Erfahrungsaustausch weiter entwickeln müsse. Die wech-
selseitigen Bestärkungen, am eingeschlagenen politischen Kurs unverrückt festzuhalten 
und entschlossen gegen alle Versuche der "friedlichen Evolution" vorzugehen, sind daher 
nicht als ideologische Lippenbekenntnisse, sondern als Ausdruck gemeinsam 
verstandener Interessen zu sehen. Denn jede größere Krise des politischen Systems in 
einem der beiden Länder hätte zwangsläufig negative Auswirkungen auf die politische 
Stabilität im Nachbarland. 
4. Neben weitgehender Übereinstimmung in innenpolitischen Fragen ist es auch auf wirt-
schaftlicher Ebene zu einer Intensivierung der Beziehungen gekommen. Beide Länder ha-
ben über 20 Handelsabkommen unterzeichnet, den 1978 unterbrochenen Eisenbahnver-
kehr wiederaufgenommen und die Grenz- und Zollformalitäten erleichtert. Der bilaterale 
Handel hat seit 1991 alljährlich beträchtliche Zuwachsraten zu verzeichnen. Diese positi-
ven Entwicklungen können indes nicht darüber hinwegtäuschen, daß ein beträchtlicher 
Handelsüberschuß zugunsten Chinas besteht, und daß beide Länder wirtschaftlich 
betrachtet wenig komplementär sind. Da Vietnam und die VR China eine nahezu 
identische Entwicklungsstrategie verfolgen, wird es darüber hinaus zu einer immer 
härteren Konkurrenz um wirtschaftliche Ressourcen und Absatzmärkte kommen. 
Aufgrund ihrer Größe und des längeren Vorlaufs in der Reformpolitik hat die VR China 
in dieser Auseinandersetzung erhebliche Vorteile gegenüber Vietnam. 
5. Diese Überlegenheit Chinas wirkt sich bereits heute sehr ungünstig auf die wirtschaftliche 
Entwicklung im Norden Vietnams aus. Umfangreiche Schmuggelgeschäfte mit einem ge-
schätzten Volumen von 500 Mio. US-$ fügen der vietnamesischen Volkswirtschaft in 
zweifacher Hinsicht Schaden zu: Durch illegale Ausfuhr landwirtschaftlicher Produkte 
nach China verliert sie dringend benötigte Devisen und bekommt dafür billige 
Konsumgüter aus China, die viele neugegründete vietnamesische Betriebe in den 
Bankrott treiben, da diese noch nicht so kostengünstig produzieren können. Ein weiterer 
Ausbau der wirtschaftlichen Beziehungen ist daher für Vietnam sehr viel weniger 
vorteilhaft als für die VR China. Wenn Vietnam trotzdem eine Intensivierung der 
wirtschaftlichen Beziehungen befürwortet, hat dies weniger wirtschaftliche als politische 
Gründe. 
6. Den derzeit wohl augenfälligsten Konfliktstoff zwischen Vietnam und China stellen die 
gegensätzlichen Gebietsansprüche in der südchinesischen See dar, für die trotz mehrjähri-
ger Verhandlungsrunden keine Annäherung der Standpunkte erzielt werden konnte. Dies 
dürfte vor allem daran liegen, daß dieses Gebiet sowohl wirtschaftliche wie strategische 
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Bedeutung hat. Außerdem ist dieses Territorialproblem nicht nur für die Führungen beider 
Länder, sondern auch für breite Bevölkerungsschichten eine Frage der nationalen Ehre. 
Da man in China wie in Vietnam den Ansehensverlust der sozialistischen Ideologie durch 
einen Rekurs auf nationalistische Parolen auszugleichen versucht, birgt diese Dimension 
des Konflikts eine noch völlig unkalkulierbare Sprengkraft in sich. 
7. Aus der vorangegangenen Analyse der politischen und wirtschaftlichen Beziehungen so-
wie der territorialen Konflikte ergibt sich weder eine eindeutige Konfliktkonstellation 
noch eine hinreichende Interessenübereinstimmung, die größere Konflikte in naher Zu-
kunft ausschließt. Für eine großangelegte militärische Auseinandersetzung in der südchi-
nesischen See, wie sie von einigen Beobachtern prognostiziert wird, liegen allerdings 
kaum erkennbare Voraussetzungen vor. 
8. Vieles deutet indes darauf hin, daß die VR China gegenüber Vietnam zwei nicht ganz ein-
fach zu vereinbarende Ziele verfolgt. Einerseits versucht sie, die Kontrolle über die süd-
chinesische See schrittweise auszubauen und langfristig ihre territorialen Ansprüche 
durchzusetzen, gleichzeitig ist sie aber auch bestrebt, einen offenen Konflikt mit Vietnam 
zu vermeiden und in Südostasien ein friedliches Umfeld zu erhalten, da dies für die weite-
re wirtschaftliche Entwicklung Chinas unabdingbar ist. 
9. Um diese beiden Ziele zu erreichen, hat Peking eine Doppelstrategie entwickelt, die Ge-
sprächsbereitschaft mit der Androhung von Gewalt und dem Schaffen vollendeter Tatsa-
chen verbindet. Gerade dadurch, daß die VR China Vietnam wie auch die anderen Nach-
barstaaten in Südostasien über ihre konkreten Territorialansprüche, ihre Intentionen sowie 
ihre zukünftige Vorgehensweise im unklaren läßt, sehr unterschiedliche Signale aussendet 
und ihre Verhandlungspositionen wiederholt revidiert, erreicht sie zweierlei: Sie kann die 
Solidarität zwischen Vietnam und den anderen ASEAN-Mitgliedern immer wieder einer 
Belastungsprobe unterziehen und sie kann zweitens durch ihr scheinbar widersprüchliches 
Vorgehen in Vietnam wie in dessen Nachbarstaaten heftige Diskussionen und Auseinan-
dersetzungen über die tatsächlichen Intentionen Chinas und die jeweils erforderlichen Ge-
genmaßnahmen auslösen und so die gegnerische Position schwächen. 
10. Vietnam hat während der vergangenen zwanzig Jahre die Erfahrung machen müsse, daß 
es seine Interessen gegenüber China nicht durch eine Konfrontationsstrategie, sondern al-
lenfalls durch einen langwierigen, aber prinzipienfesten Verhandlungsprozeß durchsetzen 
kann. Einen solchen Verhandlungsprozeß mit einem ungleich stärkeren Partner kann 
Vietnam aber nur dann zum Erfolg führen, wenn es ihm gelingt, der eigenen Position stär-
keres bzw. zusätzliches Gewicht zu verleihen. Neben dem Werben um eine vermehrte in-
ternationale Wirtschaftskooperation, durch die nicht zuletzt ökonomische Interessen ande-
rer Länder an Vietnam gebunden werden sollen, setzt Hanoi hier vor allem auf eine stär-
kere Zusammenarbeit der ASEAN-Staaten. Darüber hinaus hat Vietnam erhebliche An-
strengungen unternommen, um die Beziehungen zu seinen Partnern in der ASEAN, in Ja-
pan, der EU, Rußland und nicht zuletzt in den USA zu intensivieren und auf das Gebiet 
der Sicherheitspolitik auszudehnen, wobei es leider immer wieder zu Rückschlägen 
kommt, da es einigen Mitgliedern der vietnamesischen Führungsspitze offenbar nach wie 
vor schwerfällt, sich von alten Feindbildern zu trennen. Letzteres wird sich jedoch als 
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unerläßlich erweisen, wenn Vietnam zu einem akzeptablen Interessenausgleich mit der 
VR China kommen will. 
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Introduction 
For the past several years, Chinese-Vietnamese relations have appeared extremely contradic-
tory. Meetings between party and state leaders of the two countries are held on a regular 
basis, as well as frequent exchanges of delegations representing various parts of the social and 
political system. Since the normalization of the countries' relations began in 1991, twenty-
four mutual agreements have been signed,1 and the rise in bilateral commerce can only be de-
scribed as precipitous. But despite repeated statements stressing the unswerving friendship 
and intensive negotiations between the two countries, territorial problems have remained un-
solved to this day. China and Vietnam have repeatedly accused each other, sometimes in 
harsh words,2 of violating their respective territorial rights. Several Asia watchers have al-
ready concluded from these statements that a new Chinese-Vietnamese conflict appears inevi-
table, which itself could be the primer for a large-scale military conflict in Southeast Asia.3 
To permit a somewhat less speculative assessment, the following essay will attempt a detailed 
analysis of the cooperation and conflict potential and of the strategies and conflict behaviour 
of both sides. 
1. Cooperation and Conflict Potentials 
1.1 Political Relations 
The Chinese-Vietnamese conflict of the mid-seventies had been sparked primarily by dis-
agreements on political issues, to be precise: by disagreements over questions of foreign pol-
icy. Terrified by Mao Zedong's Cultural Revolutionary line and the approach towards the US 
which he adopted shortly thereafter, the Vietnamese leadership gradually dropped its policy 
of equidistance between Moscow and Peking and began to follow a course of closer 
cooperation with the Soviet Union. Peking's attempts to force Hanoi to revise its Moscow-
friendly policy by applying political and economic pressure only had the opposite effect. 
Backed by major arms supplies as well as a "Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation" signed 
with Moscow in November 1978, Vietnam systematically strengthened its dominant position 
in Indochina and risked total confrontation with the People's Republic of China (PRC), which 
for its part tried everything to weaken Vietnam's influence and to isolate it both at the 
international and at the regional level. 
It became clear during the 1980s that Vietnam had overstretched its means in adopting this 
kind of militant policy towards China. In Cambodia, Vietnamese troops were entrapped in at-
tritional armed conflicts with the Khmer Rouge, who were generously supported with weap-
                                                 
1 According to an interview which Foreign Minister Nguyen Manh Cam gave to Nhan Dan Daily on July 21, 
1997, quoted in Summary of World Broadcasts – Asia-Pacific (SWB-FE), July 23, 1997, B/5. 
2  For the recent disputes over territorial rights cf. Asian Defence Journal,  No. 1, 1998, p. 40. 
3 Cf. Humphrey Hawksley and Simon Holberton: Dragon Strike. The Millenium War, London 1997; also 
Richard Bernstein and Ross Munro, The Coming Conflict with China, New York 1997. 
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ons by the PRC. On Vietnam's northern border, Chinese troops, threatening to launch another 
"punitive expedition," tied down strong Vietnamese military forces. Vietnam's economy was 
completely unable to cope with these enormous challenges. Not even substantial Soviet aid 
could make up for the growing shortage of supplies which the permanent state of war and a 
policy of forced nationalization had brought upon Vietnam’s economy. 
In an attempt to find a way out of its economic crisis, the Vietnamese leadership – as so often 
before in its history – emulated the Chinese model. Restricting the agricultural cooperatives' 
powers and at the same time granting more power to private peasant-households, readmitting 
greater freedom for private initiatives in trade and commerce, and actively courting foreign 
investors marked the beginning of Deng Xiaoping's reform policy, which also found ardent 
followers in Vietnam as of the mid-eighties, although during this first phase of Vietnamese 
economic reform the country's leadership did not officially take its bearings from the Chinese 
example. 
These economic reforms were to be followed by drastic changes in Vietnam's foreign policy. 
Unconditional withdrawal of the Vietnamese troops from Cambodia in September 1989, 
along with Vietnam's constructive cooperation in reaching the "Agreement on a Comprehen-
sive Political Settlement of the Cambodian Conflict," paved the way for a normalization of 
Chinese-Vietnamese relations, following the Chinese-Soviet reconciliation in the wake of 
Gorbachev's spectacular visit to China in May 1989. 
The breakdown of socialism in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union made Vietnam and Chi-
na draw even more closely together. From the course of events in those countries, both the 
Chinese and Vietnamese leaderships drew the same conclusion: that socialism there had 
failed because economic reforms had been attempted much too late, and only half-heartedly, 
whereas political reforms had been implemented on too broad a scale and without proper 
planning. Hanoi and Peking reasoned that in times of economic opening to the outside world, 
along with the growth of the private economic sector, it is essential to maintain and defend 
undiminished the power monopoly of the Communist Party. Declarations by both sides re-
peatedly stress the need to learn from each other in this key question and the importance of an 
ongoing exchange of experience in order to further improve socialism by way of reforms.4 
Seen in this light, identical slogans such as the struggle against "peaceful evolution" and "hos-
tile forces" are by no means mere ideological lip services but in fact an expression of well-un-
derstood mutual interests, which can be defended much more convincingly on the internation-
al level by a common approach. After all, both countries' governments have to deal with the 
same problem of reconciling the political and social challenges brought about by market-
economy reforms with the power monopoly of a one-party state and having to shield off un-
desired influences from abroad. Because of China's much longer experience with reform 
policy, this exchange of experience is rather one-sided, since Vietnam follows China's exam-
                                                 
4 Cf. the statements made by Vietnam's former Communist Party Secretary General Do Muoi during his visit 
to China in July 1997. Xinhua News Agency, July 15 1997, quoted in SWB-FE, July 17, 1997, G/3f. 
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ple much more than vice versa.5 This is sometimes vented quite outspokenly by the Chinese 
side: 
Vietnam regards its further advancement of relations with China as part of the long-term inter-
ests of the Vietnamese nation, benefitting the improvement of the security environment, 
strengthening the leading role of the VCP and the socialist system, and stabilizing the political 
and economic system. Moreover, the development of these relations strengthens Vietnam's abil-
ity to resist the 'peaceful evolution' by the West and helps the country to rapidly profit from the 
successful experience which we have made with the open-door reform policy.6 
However, official pronouncements by the Chinese party and state leadership always speak of 
the mutual benefit to be obtained from exchanging this experience. These declarations are not 
so much diplomatic politeness as a statement of fact: that a mutual dependency does indeed 
exist between the systems of the two countries. Neither Peking nor Hanoi can be seriously in-
terested in a major crisis, much less in a breakdown of their respective neighbor's political 
system, because that would inevitably lead to negative repercussions in their own country, or 
rather, in the case of China, in its provinces bordering on Vietnam, which the Chinese leader-
ship regards as "politically unstable."7 
In issues of foreign policy, strong parallels are to be observed over the past few years, and 
hardly any serious clashes of interests between China and Vietnam have been registered. Both 
countries are keen on building or maintaining a broad network of foreign-policy relations, and 
most of all on becoming an integral part of the political and economic structures which have 
emerged in Southeast Asia under the auspices of ASEAN. Even if Hanoi's extension of its 
foreign-policy independence, thus strengthening its position with regard to China, naturally is 
not China's primary interest, this policy nevertheless coincides with China's interest in a polit-
ically stable and economically prosperous East and Southeast Asia, from which especially 
China profits considerably. 
1.2 Economic Relations 
Commerce between the PRC and Vietnam has increased substantially since the normalization 
of bilateral relations in 1991. Both countries have signed a number of trade agreements, have 
again reopened railway links after they had been cut in 1978, and have facilitated border 
trade.8 According to Chinese Customs' statistics, the volume of trade rose from US $31 mil-
                                                 
5 For example, the theoretical review of the VCP often describes China's political campaigns and measures 
and analyses its role model function. Cf. Nguyen Huy Quy, Ve xay dung van ninh tinh than xa hoi chu nghia 
o Trung Quoc (On the Construction of a Socialist Open-Minded Civilization in China), in Tap Chi Cong San 
No. 2, 1997, p. 53ff, whereas the theoretical review of the Chinese Communist Party discusses Vietnam's 
development only sporadically. 
6 Ni Xiayun, Yuegong ba da hou nei wai zhengce zouxiang (The course of development taken by Vietnam's 
national and foreign policy after the VPC's 8th Party Congress), in Xindai guoji guanxi, No. 8, 1996, p. 18.  
7 For an appraisal of the security situation in the various Chinese provinces by the Chinese leadership cf. 
Secret Document No. 1106, reprinted and commented in Zheng Ming, Hong Kong Jan. 1997, p. 8ff. Also see 
International Herald Tribune, April 4, 1997, p. 2. 
8 For the most recent facilitations of border trade cf. Vietnam News Agency (VNA), Sept. 12, 1997, quoted in 
SWB-FE (Weekly Economic Report), Sept. 24, 1997, WB/4.  
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lion in 1991 to US $1.1 billion in 1996. Although Vietnamese statistics suggest a much small-
er scale of trade, they too ascertain a sharp rise in the volume of trade. 
Charts illustrating the development of trade according to Chinese and Vietnamese statistics 
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Source: Chinese data are taken from the magazine China's Customs Statistics No. 12, 1990 – 95. Vietnamese 
data are taken from Nien Giam Thong Ke (Statistical Yearbook), Hanoi 1996, 1997. pp. 208 and 212. 
The chart contains data only until 1995, since we have no Vietnamese data for 1996. 
China likes to see this remarkable increase in bilateral trade with Vietnam as proof of the 
"complementarity" of their economies, which would appear to be a favorable precondition for 
a further extension of economic relations.9 However, a closer scrutiny of the economic struc-
tures of Vietnam and China – especially in those parts of China mainly involved in economic 
                                                 
9 For example, cf. China's Vice-premier Wu Bangguo's statements at a meeting held with Vietnamese Premier 
Phan Van Khai on July 15, 1997, Xinhua News Agency, July 15, 1997, quoted in SWB-FE, July 17, 1997, 
G/2. 
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cooperation with Vietnam – leads to the conclusion that both sides are much too similar to ac-
tually complement each other. Both economies are still strongly dominated by agriculture. In 
their development strategies both countries want to attract foreign direct investment in labor-
intensive light industries, with the aim of selling the major part of their products abroad. 
We can therefore predict that Peking's as well as Hanoi's policies of market-economy reforms 
and the open-door policy will lead to severe competition between them for economic re-
sources and foreign markets. This competition is further complicated by the fact that both the 
PRC and Vietnam profit primarily from investment by the Overseas Chinese, who are contin-
uing to shift their labor-intensive production from Southeast-Asia to China and Vietnam. This 
becomes particularly obvious if we look at the Hong Kong and Taiwanese examples, ranking 
among the biggest investors both on the Chinese mainland and in Vietnam.10 Whereas Hanoi 
had spoken of its anxieties that Hong Kong might reduce its flow of investment into Vietnam 
as a result of its handover to the PRC, and that Peking could use these investment flows to ex-
ert additional pressure on Hanoi,11 Vietnam can rest assured of the Taiwan government's sup-
port, which encourages its business people – under the slogan of "Go-South-Policy" – to in-
vest widely in Vietnam in order to avoid a one-sided and – from Taipei’s point of view – po-
litically undesirable attachment of Taiwan to the PRC.12 Like for foreign direct investment, 
the two countries also compete for the aid of international financing organizations, e.g. the 
World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, without whose help urgently needed infra-
structural measures in both countries could not materialize.13 
Moreover, a continuation of the high rate of economic growth is possible only if other vital 
resources are at the countries' disposal on a much larger scale than at present. This concerns 
not only the rapidly rising demand for energy,14 but also an increasing demand for water15 and 
staple food such as rice, fish and other seafood, especially as the latter make up a considerable 
percentage of Vietnam's export income. Disagreements between the PRC and Vietnam over 
these basic and gradually vanishing resources as well as over larger market shares for 
products of an export-oriented industry can already be clearly seen today. In times of 
economic difficulties, which East and Southeast Asia are facing at the moment, these conflicts 
are bound to increase rather than decrease. 
                                                 
10 According to the German Bundesstelle für Außenhandelsinformationen (BfAI), Taiwan in Sept. 1996 was 
the second biggest investor in the PRC after Hong Kong/Macao (US $35 billion), and the biggest investor in 
Vietnam (US $ 4.2 billion). BfAI – Länder und Märkte, Sept. 9, 1997, and Jan. 23, 1997. 
11  Financial Times, June 4, 1997, p. 7. 
12  Cf. Taiwan Aktuell. Aug. 8, 1996, p. 1. 
13 According to figures issued by the World Bank, Vietnam will need US $ 4.2 billion in development aid in 
1998 alone. Financial Times, Nov. 13 1997, p. 6.  
14  For further details, see section 1.3. 
15 A serious clash of interests between the PRC and Vietnam is already taking place in the question of 
exploiting the Mekong river. China's planned power plants on the upper course of the Mekong would 
inevitably lead to a water shortage in the Mekong delta, Vietnam's rice-bowl. Cf. Financial Times, June 25, 
1997, p. 8. 
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Because of its size, and hence its attractiveness for foreign investors, and also because of ten 
years of experience with reform policy prior to Vietnam's, the PRC clearly has all the advan-
tages on its side, which Vietnam, despite its high growth rates in the first part of the 1990s – 
as the chart below illustrates – has not been able to catch up with. Recent figures from Viet-
nam, which indicate a decline in foreign investment by over 50% for 1997,16 and growing dif-
ficulties for companies which have already invested in Vietnam17 give rise to the assumption 
that Vietnam will probably not be able to make up for its disadvantage in competition with 
China during the coming years either. 
Comparison of the economic potentials of the PRC and Vietnam 
 Vietnam PR China Ratio 
Population 
(millions) 
 1978 
 1992 
 1995 
 1996 
 
 
51.5 
71.7 
75.7 
77.3 
 
 
 958.8 
 1,184.4 
 1,210.5 
 1,221.6 
 
 
0.054 
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0.062 
0.063 
GNP1978 
(US $ billions) 
 
7.6 
 
 131.5 
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GDP 1992 
(US $ billions) 
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 1996 
16.0 
 
21.3 
23.6 
 436.3 
 
 560.0 
 616.0 
0.037 
 
0.038 
0.038 
GNP (per Capita) 
 1978 
 
147.0 
 
 137.0 
 
1.072 
GDP (per Capita)  
 1992 
 1995 
 1996 
 
225.0 
281.0 
305.3 
 
 368.0 
 462.6 
 504.3 
 
0.611 
0.607 
0.605 
                                                 
16 Far Eastern Economic Review (FEER), Jan. 15, 1998, p. 57. 
17 International Herald Tribune, Nov. 27, 1997, p. 17 
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** The systematics of the above chart and the data for 1978 and 1992 were taken from R. Betts, Vietnam's Stra-
tegic Predicament, in: Survival, No. 3, 1995, p. 68. The data for my calculations for 1995 and 1996 are based 
on figures from The International Institute for Strategic Studies (ed.), Military Balance 1996/97, London 
1996, p. 179 and p. 200, and Military Balance 1997/98, London 1997, p. 176 and p. 197, in order to attain 
the common calculation base necessary for a comparison. 
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China's superiority has already had extremely negative effects on the economic development 
in northern Vietnam since the opening of the border in 1989. While investments into Vietnam 
from the PRC (not including Hong Kong) attained a volume of merely US $ 70 million,18 
smuggling across the Chinese-Vietnamese border has reached a scale which greatly damages 
Vietnam's economic development.19 Rice and other agricultural products which account for 
important foreign currency when sold on the world market are illegally exported to China in 
order to be exchanged for light-industrial goods, which in turn are illegally imported into 
Vietnam. Since these products are second-rate goods from mass production, and accordingly 
cheap, they drive many newly founded Vietnamese enterprises into bankruptcy, because so 
far these do not have the means to produce at such inexpensive rates.20 According to a report 
by the Vietnam News Agency, Chinese products worth US $ 500 million were illegally 
imported into Vietnam in 1996 alone.21 
Thus, Vietnam suffers a double detriment: through its illegal exports it keeps losing foreign 
currency vitally important to its economy, and in return it receives products which are hinder-
ing the build-up of its own light industry and new job opportunities. Seen from a purely eco-
nomic point of view, a further extension of economic relations with China is therefore far less 
advantageous for Vietnam, and especially its northern region, than for China. While Vietnam 
presents a profitable market for Chinese second-choice consumer goods which China cannot 
easily sell on the world market because of their low quality, Vietnam gets products from Chi-
na which it can also get from other countries or which it will be able to produce on its own in 
the foreseeable future. Likewise, Vietnam would be quite able to sell the majority of its 
goods, currently being illegally exported to China, on the world market in return for hard cur-
rency. Vietnam's continuing interest in good economic relations with China is thus due to po-
litical rather than economic considerations. An official of the Vietnamese foreign ministry 
openly stated this fact in an interview with the "Far Eastern Economic Review:" 
We don't expect China to have an important role in the modernization and industrialization of 
Vietnam. [Vietnam's leaders] have no hope in this area, but from the view of political relations 
sometimes they should mention it.22 
                                                 
18 According to a statement by Vietnam's Foreign Minister Nguyen Manh Cam to VNA on July 21, 1997, 
quoted in SWB-FE, July 23, 1997, B/5. 
19 In one of the first decrees issued by the new Premier Phan Van Khai in Oct. 1997 to all ministeries and 
administrative departments concerned, he demanded that drastic measures be taken against the upswing in 
smuggling activity. VNA, Oct. 17, 1997, quoted in SWB-FE, Oct 20, 1997, B/3. 
20 Cf. Nhan Dan, Oct. 29, 1997, p. 1 and 3, quoted in SWB-FE, Nov. 11 1997, B/7f. 
21 Vietnam Investment Review, Dec. 1, 1997, p. 13. This amount would also account for the considerable 
differences between the Chinese and Vietnamese figures for the volume of trade (see chart 1), which also 
derive from the fact that although Chinese export goods to Vietnam are properly declared with the Chinese 
officials in order to derive the tax advantages involved, they are afterwards imported into Vietnam without 
the knowledge of the Vietnamese customs and therefore don't show up in the Vietnamese statistics. 
22 FEER, Aug. 8, 1997, p. 72. 
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1.3 Territorial Conflicts 
The most spectacular cause of conflict between China and Vietnam is surely the controversial 
territorial claims in the South China Sea. Although a mutual agreement on basic principles for 
settling the disputes relating to the land border and to dividing the Gulf of Tonkin was signed 
on October 19, 1993,23 and negotiations on this problem have taken place on several occa-
sions, the tensions over this issue continue to this day. As Vietnam's foreign minister remark-
ed, the only slight progress made so far has been that concerning the question of the land bor-
der and the definition of boundaries in the Golf of Tonkin. But in the much more important 
and complicated disputes over the Paracels and the Spratly islands there is no understanding 
in sight.24 The reason for this is most likely that there exist various and mutually reinforcing 
causes behind these territorial conflicts. 
For one, this area is of major economic importance because of its actual or merely assumed 
oil and natural gas resources. As already mentioned, the continuation of the high rate of eco-
nomic growth both in Vietnam and China is closely linked to an increasing demand for 
energy supplies. China, which during the 1980s was able to make some profits by exporting 
mineral oil, has had to import oil since 1993.25 Because its rate of domestic mineral oil 
production showed an annual increase of only 2% over the past ten years, 20 million tons had 
to be imported in 1996, which equals approximately 15% of the total demand. Unless new 
mineral resources can be exploited in the near future, China with its predicted economic 
growth of 9-10% would have to import approximately 50 million tons of oil annually by the 
year 2000, and approximately 100 million tons by 2010.26 Whereas the output of the 
resources exploited so far, 90% of which are to be found in Manchuria and Shandong 
province, is bound to decrease over the following years, new deposits of substantial size are 
expected to be discovered only in the Tarim basin,27 which however is 3,700 kilometers away 
from the PRC's national oil pipeline. 
Contrary to China, Vietnam grosses nearly 30% of its export revenue by selling crude oil 
abroad. For 1997 a total output of 9.5 million tons is aimed at (1 million tons more than last 
year's capacity)28 which are largely drilled in those sea territories to which China also claims 
territorial rights. Especially Chinese military circles have repeatedly criticized the fact that 
other, militarily weaker states are taking advantage of China's reserved attitude and are en-
                                                 
23  Cf. SWB-FE, Oct. 21, 1993, B/2f. 
24 Foreign Minister Nguyen Manh Cam in Nhan Dan Daily on July 21, 1997, quoted in Deutsche Welle, 
Monitor-Dienst Asien (DW-Asien), July 24, 1997, p. 3. 
25 Cf. Nicolas Becquelin, The Oil Industry in China since the Reforms of the Open-door-Policy, China 
Perspectives, Jan./Feb. 1997, p. 22. 
26 International Herald Tribune, April 4, 1997, p. 4, and June 10, 1997, p.15. 
27 To obtain more precise data on the size of the minerol oil deposits there, a contract was signed in July 1997 
with a Japanese mineral oil syndicate, which is to undertake detailed explorations and preliminary drillings. 
Xinhua News Agency, July 23, 1997, quoted in SWB-FE (Weekly Economic Report), July 30, 1997, WG/7. 
28 VNA, August 24, 1997, quoted in SWB-FE (Weekly Economic Report), Aug. 27, 1997, WB/3. 
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deavoring to exploit mineral resources that actually belong to China.29 Along with the mineral 
oil, which, as some experts believe, is probably much less than earlier estimates predicted,30 
natural gas resources in this area are becoming more and more important for Vietnam's power 
supply.31 While in 1995, when Vietnam started exploiting natural gas, the daily output was 
only 1 million cubic meters, the plan for 1997 aimed at three times this amount.32 This con-
siderable growth rate demonstrates that Vietnam's exporting of mineral oil is no proof of a do-
mestic surplus of energy, but rather that Vietnam does not yet have enough capacity for refin-
ing its crude oil to produce sufficient energy to sustain its high economic growth rates. De-
spite the growing use of natural gas for energy production, a deficit of 2.8 billion kilowatt-
hours of electric power was ascertained for 1997 alone.33 
Along with the economic importance of this area, its strategic importance is evident as well. 
Whoever controls the islands in the South China Sea and installs adequate monitoring and 
military facilities there not only holds a key position in Southeast Asia but will also control 
the shipping routes through which 80% of Japanese oil imports and about 25% of the world's 
ocean freight pass.34 While Vietnam, which, should the Chinese territorial claims be recogniz-
ed, would be cut off from its free access to its most important navigation routes to East Asia, 
favors a political and security-oriented settlement of this issue, to be worked out under the 
auspices of the "Asian Regional Forum," the PRC adamantly upholds its claim that all these 
islands in the South China Sea are inalienable Chinese territory. Although the Chinese leader-
ship has publicly stated that it is willing to guarantee the freedom of international navigation 
routes by sea or by air in this region, adhering to international law,35 it has so far failed to de-
fine which regions of the South China Sea it considers to be China's inland waterways and 
which it regards to be international waters. The missile maneuvers carried out by the PRC in 
the Taiwan strait in March 1996 have given rise to serious doubts about China's calculability 
in such crises – not only in Taiwan, but also worldwide –, especially since Peking has given 
no clear indication so far as to whether it would impose controls or registration measures and 
charge fees for navigation rights. 
And thirdly, this territorial conflict is also a question of national honor.36 Compromises or 
concessions in this territorial dispute could therefore be liable to suspicion of national treason. 
More so, since the leaderships of both countries are trying to make up for the loss of face suf-
fered by socialist ideology as a result of reform policy by resorting to national values and slo-
gans. These campaigns aimed at strengthening national sovereignty and warding off foreign 
                                                 
29 Cf. Mark J. Valencia, Energy and Insecurity in Asia, Survival, Vol. 39. No.3, Autumn 1997, p. 96. 
30 Cf. FEER, March 30, 1995, p. 4 and The Economist, March 29, 1997, p. 68. 
31 Cf. FEER, March 23, 1996, p. 60. 
32 SWB-FE (Weekly Economic Report), Aug. 27, 1997, WB/3. 
33 International Herald Tribune, March 21, 1997, p. 17. 
34 The Economist, March 29, 1997, p. 68. 
35  According to a spokesman of the Chinese Foreign Ministry. Quoted in Beijing Review, May 8, 1995, p. 22. 
36 For the nationalistic component of this conflict seen from China's point of view cf. Chen Jie, China's Spratly 
Policy. With Special Reference to the Philippines and Malaysia, in: Asian Survey, No. 10, 1994, p. 893 ff. 
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interference37 have, both in China and Vietnam, been primarily directed against undesired in-
fluences from the West, but the more such nationalistic ideas are propagated, the more likely 
traditional enemy perceptions and animosities are to resurface. 
In the case of Vietnam, a rebound against China is inevitable in this respect, because Viet-
nam's sense of national indentity has evolved primarily from its permanent struggle against 
the "threat from the north." In the case of China, confrontation with Vietnam does not seem to 
be quite as imperative, but from the Chinese point of view Vietnam, historically and cultural-
ly, is one of the countries still occupying Chinese terrritories taken away from China by the 
imperialist powers in times of national weakness. Since the nationalist positions outlined 
above are shared not only by the leaderships of both countries but also by broad strata of the 
population – and last but not least by overseas Chinese and Vietnamese – we have to take into 
account that spontaneous actions could arise which it would be difficult for the governments 
to control. The occupation of the Senkaku (Chinese: Diaoyutai) islands by national activists 
from Taiwan and Hong Kong is a recent example of how delicate and difficult these situations 
can turn out to be for governments.38 
2. Strategies of Conflict Settlement 
From the analysis of the Chinese-Vietnamese situation undertaken above we cannot draw def-
inite conclusions about either conflict or cooperation constellations. Although on a political 
level there exists a high degree of similarity and many identical interests, the economic inter-
ests of both countries differ vastly. On the issue of territorial conflicts in the South China Sea, 
China and Vietnam continue to disagree profoundly. 
2.1 The strategy of the PRC 
As already mentioned, some Asia watchers observing Chinese-Vietnamese relations have 
concentrated on these territorial issues, and in the face of a Chinese military build-up in this 
region have come to the conclusion that the PRC is prepared to enforce its claims in the South 
China Sea by means of a large-scale operation "Dragon Strike" by its air force and naval units 
in the not-too-distant future. The following arguments, however, support the thesis that such a 
scenario is not likely to occur. 
Repeated protestations by the Chinese leadership that peaceful relations with its neighbors are 
an imperative precondition for the most important goal of China's policy, namely its econom-
ic development, should not be understood as mere propaganda, even if they are continually 
infringed by Peking's military actions. There is no doubt that China's economy could not cope 
with the direct or indirect impact of a major military conflict within the next ten to twenty 
                                                 
37 Cf. Jiang Zemin's speech in which he demands a strengthening of patriotic education, specifically also with 
regard to the repatriation of Hong Kong, in Renmin Ribao, May 11, 1997, p. 1, and IHT, May 13, 1997, p. 4. 
The foremost aim of Vietnam's "Campaign against Social Evils," initiated in early 1996, was to defend 
national integrity against foreign influences. Cf. The Economist, Feb. 10, 1996, p. 58ff. 
38 Süddeutsche Zeitung, July 2, 1997, p. 7. 
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years, since the repercussions on the Chinese social and ultimately on its political system 
could very well prove disastrous. Even the argument that a military action would give China 
access to sources of energy in this region, securing major economic benefits, is hardly con-
vincing, since the energy resources in the South China Sea are completely insufficient to cov-
er China's energy demand.39 
China's economic weakness engenders military weakness, too. Although the PRC has made 
great efforts to reform its army and especially to strengthen and modernize its naval and air 
forces in the South China Sea since the 1980s, most military experts agree that over the next 
ten to fifteen years the PRC's capacities and know-how will not be sufficient to adequately 
control this vast sea territory.40 Chinese units may be able to occupy individual islands and in-
stall boundary marks or even military equipment, but they are not able to defend all these 
claims. When, in July 1997, Philippine soldiers destroyed border marks and buildings which 
Chinese units had set up on some of the Spratly islands, the PRC protested but took no coun-
ter-action.41 
Moreover, such a large-scale offensive, exclusively aimed at a massive employment of mili-
tary means, would not be in line with the classical principles of Chinese military doctrine, 
which traditionally believes in a firm correlation of political and military strategy and whose 
highest tactical ambition is to subjugate the enemy without employing direct warfare.42 That 
these principles not only remain part of the curricula of Chinese military academies to this 
present day but have influenced the PRC's strategy to a high degree can be seen in all of Chi-
na's military actions so far, which have been very limited in time and space and have always 
been accompanied by political initiatives. 
China's policy towards Vietnam can be better understood when seen not only in the light of 
territorial issues, but much more so by taking a broader view of China's controversial interests 
and the very complicated strategy that they demand: Peking on the one hand wants to expand 
its control over the South China Sea step by step, successfully realizing its territorial claims in 
the long run and to the greatest extent possible; on the other hand it wants to avoid any lasting 
deterioration of the Chinese-Vietnamese situation, which would clearly harm China's eco-
nomic and political interests and would eventually result in the ASEAN countries forming a 
united front against China. 
In order to achieve these almost incompatible goals, the PRC has developed a twofold strate-
gy, combining manifestations of goodwill such as bilateral dialog, negotiations at various lev-
els and regular meetings of the party and state leaderships with military actions or threats 
                                                 
39 See section 1.3. 
40 John Downing, China's Evolving Maritime Strategy, Jane's Intelligence Review, March 1996, p. 131f. 
41 Asian Defense Journal. Aug. 1997, p. 60. 
42 Cf. the quote by Sun Zi in his famous work "Art of War:" "Subjugating the enemy's army without fighting is 
the true pinnacle of excellence. Thus the highest realization of warfare is to attack the enemy's plans; next is 
to attack their alliances; next to attack their army; and the lowest is to attack their fortified cities." Sun Zi, 
Bingfa (Art of War), Taibei 1975, S. 34 ff. 
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thereof, confronting the other side with faits accomplis such as occupying islands, installing 
military installations on several isles and undertaking exploratory drillings in the disputed sea 
territories. As one example of recent developments illustrates – the following chronology 
covering the crisis over a Chinese drilling platform in March/April 1997 – , the elements of 
cooperation and conflict are so tightly interlinked that they appear at first sight to be totally 
confusing and contradictory. 
Chronology of the Crisis in March/April 1997 
Early March A Chinese drilling platform starts oil explorations in an area in the 
Golf of Tonkin which is closer to the Vietnamese than to the Chinese 
border. 
March 10 Vietnam lodges a protest with the Chinese embassy in Hanoi. 
March 15 China denies that this territory is situated in Vietnamese waters. 
March 18 The spokesman of the Chinese foreign ministry, Cui Tiankai pro-
nounces that the drilling platform is situated within the territory of the 
Chinese continental shelf and China's exclusive economic zone, there-
fore China is not willing under any circumstances to negotiate this is-
sue. The very same day, Luo Gan, General Secretary of the State 
Council starts his long-planned visit to Vietnam. The topic of the Chi-
nese drilling platform is not brought up, instead, words of "good and 
neighborly friendship" abound. 
 
March 20 
The Chinese news agency "Zhongguo Tongxun" based in Hong Kong 
reports about the efforts by the Chinese navy to replace the former 
coast guard by a blue water fleet. ASEAN ambassadors gather in 
Hanoi and express solidarity with Vietnam but call for a bilateral 
solution to the conflict. Only the embassy of the Philippines issues a 
declaration in which China is criticized in somewhat harsher words. 
March 27 Foreign Office Spokesman Cui Tiankai reiterates China's standpoint of 
March 18, but simultaneously hints at China's willingness to take up 
negotiations. 
April 1 China agrees to negotiations over the drilling platform incident. 
April 4 The Chinese remove their drilling platform from the disputed area. 
China's party leader Jiang Zemin receives Vietnamese politburo mem-
ber Le Minh Huong. Both sides praise the amicable cooperation be-
tween the two countries. 
April 9 Commencement of Chinese-Vietnamese negotiations on the drilling 
platform incident, which are terminated a few days later without any 
results. 
April 30 A Chinese vessel invades waters claimed by the Philippines. 
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Different explanations have been advanced for these obvious contradictions between militant 
behaviour and willingness to compromise, also evident in other Chinese-Vietnamese crises 
during the last five years.43 Some argue that regional and local departments are to be held re-
sponsible for starting such incidents of their own accord without the orders or even approval 
of the Chinese government, whereas the latter endeavors to limit the damage and strives for a 
diplomatic settlement.44 Other experts have observed differences of interests between the ar-
my and the Foreign Ministry which are bound to result in such diverse strategies.45 However, 
as the above chronology demonstrates, there are no manifestations of divergent proclamations 
and strategies between the central government and the local departments. On the contrary, it 
is quite evident that the government in Peking, or rather its Foreign Ministry, has repeatedly 
revised its own publicly taken positions. 
We can therefore conclude that this – on the surface of it – inconsistent behaviour in crisis 
scenarios cannot be explained by a lack of strategic logic but should instead be seen in the 
context of political calculations which are ultimately based on the principles of traditional 
Chinese military strategy. Peking's strategy is clearly aimed at leaving Vietnam and the other 
states in Southeast Asia in the dark about its intentions and strategic operations. Despite sev-
eral workshops, meetings and negotiation rounds, the PRC has so far failed to present detailed 
maps precisely delineating the territories it claims.46 Similarly, Peking has so far – despite re-
peated appeals by the ASEAN countries and the US – avoided stating in a White Paper exact-
ly what it intends by reinforcing and modernizing its military forces in the South China Sea.47 
Instead, it has left the other side speculating wildly. 
With this strategy, which directly aims to thwart transparency by sending out the most diverse 
signals in situations of acute crisis, which attempts exploratory drilling in a disputed region 
and withdraws from it after few weeks, or which adamantly refuses to open negotiations and 
then takes them up two days later, Peking achieves two things: it is constantly putting the so-
lidarity between Vietnam and the other ASEAN members to new nerve-wrecking tests, and 
on the other hand its seemingly contradictory behaviour instigates heated discussions and 
quarrels within the Vietnamese leadership and those of the other ASEAN states as to China's 
real intentions and how to take appropriate counteraction, ultimately weakening the opposite 
side. 
All of these ploys – withdrawing from exploratory drilling already under way, offering talks, 
commencing new rounds of negotiations at various levels – should therefore not be seen as 
concessions, much less as a revision of earlier positions, but rather as part of a pro-active 
                                                 
43 Vietnamese experts have counted nine incidents since 1991 in which a Chinese-Vietnamese "friendship" 
visit has coincided with unfriendly maritime gestures by the PRC in the South China Sea.  The Economist, 
March 29, 1997,  p. 68. 
44 International Herald Tribune, April 24, 1997, p. 2. 
45 Asian Wall Street Journal, July 20, 1994, p. 5. 
46 Cf. Indonesia's complaint about China's refusal to clarify the boundaries of its exclusive economic zones. 
Quoted in SWB-FE, Sept. 23, 1997, B/4. 
47 Cf. the interview with US Defense Secretary William Cohen. International Tribune, Oct. 9, 1997, p.10. 
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strategy, because they serve to reassure all those in the opposition camp who tend a priori not 
to overestimate certain measures by the PRC (reinforcement of the air force and the navy, sei-
zure of vessels, occupation of new islands), since in their view the majority of the Chinese 
leadership is ultimately interested in a peaceful solution of these conflicts, and militant coun-
termeasures would only encourage the hardliners within the Chinese leadership and escalate 
the existing conflicts in the manner of a self-fulfilling prophecy.48 
2.2 Vietnam's Strategy 
How can Vietnam counter this highly flexible and utterly unpredictable strategy? Like for the 
Chinese, avoiding an open conflict or even an open military conflict with China is probably 
top priority for the Vietnamese, too. Many older party members consider the PRC a socialist 
brother who should not unnecessarily be challenged in times in which socialism has gone 
onto the defensive.49 But even seen in a less ideological light, the fact remains that Vietnam's 
air force and navy units are clearly inferior to China's50 and that the indirect and direct burden 
of any such armed conflict would ruin everything that Vietnam has accomplished during the 
past ten years. Therefore, Vietnam has to do everything in its power to place its relations with 
China on a new foundation and to secure new basic agreements with Peking which give 
greater credit to Vietnam's economic interests than has been the case so far. 
These goals cannot be attained by alienating or isolating China but have to be pursued in a 
long-term and steadfast negotiation process. For this reason, continuing and improving dialog 
with China – despite constant setbacks – is the cornerstone of Vietnam's strategic concept. An 
important positive precondition to this end is that Vietnam and China have hardly any com-
munication problems. During the long-standing common history of the two countries, in 
which elements of cooperation and conflict have often been intermingled, both sides have de-
veloped a subtle understanding of the intentions of their counterpart, but also of the ways and 
means in which these intentions are communicated. It is hardly imaginable that such fatal 
misinterpretations as those which primarily led to the escalation of the US military engage-
ment in Vietnam could be repeated within the Chinese-Vietnamese relationship.51 
But a dialog with an immensely stronger partner can only achieve or at least come close to the 
desired results on condition that Vietnam succeeds in putting more weight behind its position. 
This is first of all a question of economic power. As a promising locality for investments, an 
export outlet, and a potent economic partner, Vietnam is also able to attract the political inter-
ests of other countries. Especially regarding its off-shore mineral oil exploration and produc-
tion, treaties with Russian, US, Japanese and Malaysian oil companies have gained not only 
                                                 
48 For a full discussion of this position cf. Chang Pao-Min, Vietnam and China: New Opportunities and New 
Challenges, in: Contemporary Southeast Asia, No. 2, Sept. 1997, p. 136ff. 
49 FEER, June 8, 1995, p. 15. 
50 For the combat power of the Vietnamese army see Micool Brooke, The Armed Forces of Vietnam, in: Asian 
Defense Journal, Nov. 1997, p. 6ff. 
51 Cf. Robert S. McNamara, In Retrospect. The Tragedy and Lessons of Vietnam, New York 1995. 
22 Berichte des BIOst 1998 
commercial but also politico-strategic importance for Vietnam.52 Conversely, this also means 
that any deterioration of the investment climate and a decline in investments in this area 
would imply a weakening of Vietnam's position towards China. 
At the political level, ASEAN is the most important international forum for Vietnam. Since 
Vietnam was granted full membership of ASEAN in 1995, it has, in times of crises in the Chi-
nese-Vietnamese relationship, always tried to convince the other ASEAN member states that 
it is only through unity that can China be induced to make concessions. As already made clear 
by the chronology above, this is no easy feat, as opinions differ widely within ASEAN as to 
which tactics to use towards China, and since the PRC itself is doing its best to heighten these 
differences. 
Vietnam has therefore been wise to cement its relations with its dialog partners in ASEAN, 
the EU, Japan, Russia and not least the US. It has signed several agreements not only with in-
dividual states of the EU, but also with the EU as a whole, concerning development-policy 
cooperation. When Japan's premier Hashimoto traveled through Southeast Asia in January 
1997, announcing an enhanced Japanese commitment to this region, his hosts throughout re-
acted with polite reserve. Only Vietnam showed a positive response, and both countries 
agreed to include military and security questions in their mutual exchange of experience.53 
Russian-Vietnamese relations, having become practically non-existent after the breakdown of 
the Soviet Union, also regained much of their original importance during the 1990s. By ratify-
ing a new friendship treaty in 1994, by continuing cooperation in off-shore oil production and 
the Russian military presence in Cam Ranh Bay and, last but not least, by supplying modern 
jet fighters to Vietnam, Russia has become one of Vietnam's most important allies, bestowing 
it with the function of an interlocutor between Russia and the ASEAN states.54 The most re-
cent steps undertaken in American-Vietnamese relations were even more spectacular. Hanoi 
has not restricted itself merely to intensifying political and economic relations with the US 
but also started military negotiations in spring of 1997. On March 21st, 1997 – in the middle 
of the Chinese-Vietnamese crisis outlined above – the head of the US pacific fleet, Admiral 
Josef Prueher, undertook an official visit to Vietnam to discuss "a nascent military relation-
ship"55 with his hosts, after Vietnam had stated that it would welcome a continuing American 
military presence in Southeast Asia.56 Prueher's visit was followed by several other meetings 
between military representatives of both countries. 
                                                 
52 The Vietnamese-Soviet (Russian) joint venture Vietsovpetro has been in existence since 1981, extracting 
more than 80% of Vietnam's mineral oil. Vietnam signed similar treaties with the American companies 
Mobil Oil and Conoco in 1996. FEER, May 25, 1996, p. 65. Similar agreements were reached with the 
Malaysian oil firm Petronas in 1996. VNA, June 13, 1997, quoted in SWB-FE (Weekly Economic Report), 
June 18, 1997, WB/4. Negotiations with Japanese firms have to my knowledge not been concluded so far. 
53 Asian Wall Street Journal, March 27, 1997. p. 8. 
54 For Vietnam's new role as go-between, which has been encouraged both by Russia and by ASEAN countries, 
cf. Gerhard Will, Rußlands Politik gegenüber Südostasien, Berichte des Bundesinstituts für 
ostwissenschaftliche und internationale Studien, No. 40, 1997,S. 24 ff. 
55 FEER, April 3, 1997, p. 16. 
56 Financial Times, March 22/23, 1997, p. 4. 
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These foreign policy initiatives by Vietnam, which are also aimed at closer cooperation in the 
field of security policy, necessarily meet with some difficulties. First of all with the question 
of how far to take this security-policy cooperation. The Vietnamese party and army leadership 
widely agrees that the Vietnamese armed forces need to be modernized with the help of for-
eign weapon systems.57 However, there is a lot of disagreement about the question as to 
whether and on what scale military data, experience and assessments should be exchanged or 
whether and how to develop common strategic conceptions.58 
These disagreements cannot merely be explained away as remnants of old, never-dispelled 
hostilities, they are also part of a precarious tightrope walk which Vietnam is having to per-
form in its relationship with China. Vietnam is confronted with the difficult task of articulat-
ing its claims clearly, of refuting those of the PRC, and of persuading China to pull back, as it 
did when it withdrew its drilling platform in April, 1997. At the same time Vietnam has to 
keep up the dialog with Peking and avoid another confrontation like the one which occurred 
in the 1980s. Furthermore, Hanoi will have to react with similar versatility to Peking's 
flexible strategy and its rapid tactical twists. This is a lot more difficult for the Vietnamese 
leadership, since it always has to take into account the interests and strategies of its foreign-
policy partners and has to conduct its actions accordingly. To this purpose, Vietnam has 
developed its concept of "diversified foreign policy," which demands various initiatives of 
Vietnamese diplomacy, both regionally and internationally. But according to one official at 
the Vietnamese foreign ministry, all these different activities have only one aim in mind: 
... despite all our talk about diversified foreign policy, China is for us the most important rela-
tionship. We spend most of our time and resources dealing with the Chinese and will have to 
continue to do so...59 
                                                 
57 Charlyle A. Thayer, Force Modernization: The Case of Vietnam's People's Army, in Contemporary 
Southeast Asia, No. 1, June 1997, p. 1ff. 
58 During the first meetings the Vietnamese side has not appeared to be very cooperative. Information to the 
author by Carlyle Thayer, July 3, 1997 in Amsterdam. 
59 Quoted in Allan E. Goodman, Vietnam in 1994, in: Asian Survey, No. 1, 1995, p. 99. 
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Summary 
Introductory Remarks 
For the past several years, Chinese-Vietnamese relations have appeared extremely contradic-
tory. Despite repeated affirmations of unswerving friendship, frequent exchanges of delega-
tions at all levels, and pronounced growth in commercial relations, the two sides accuse each 
other publicly and sometimes in very harsh terms of violating each other's territorial integrity. 
Some Asia watchers have already drawn the conclusion that a new military altercation be-
tween the two neighbors appears inevitable in the long term and could indeed be the primer 
for a large-scale military conflict in Southeast Asia. The aim of the present work is to conduct 
a detailed analysis of the cooperation and conflict potentials involved and of the conflict strat-
egies pursued by both sides, in order to permit a somewhat less speculative assessment of 
their bilateral relationship. 
The report is based mainly on an appraisal of government statements and media commentar-
ies from the PR China and the SR Vietnam. Reports and articles in international newspapers 
and journals were drawn upon by way of background information. 
Findings 
1. In the latter half of the seventies, Vietnam's policy, aimed at forging a close alliance with 
the Soviet Union and at achieving a dominant position in Indochina, had sparked off an 
open conflict with China and brought Vietnam to the brink of economic ruin. In an at-
tempt to find a way out of its economic crisis, Hanoi, as so often before in the history of 
Vietnam, looked to the Chinese for a model; in this case the economic reforms initiated in 
China since 1978. Some years later, the unconditional withdrawal of the Vietnamese 
troops from Cambodia, Hanoi's constructive cooperation in reaching an international 
agreement to settle the Cambodian conflict, and, last but not least, the reconciliation be-
tween China and the Soviet Union paved the way for a normalization of Chinese-Viet-
namese relations. 
2. The collapse of socialism in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union brought Vietnam and 
China even closer together. The conclusion drawn in both Hanoi and Peking from this 
course of events was that socialism had failed because economic reforms had been at-
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tempted too late and only half-heartedly in those countries, whereas political reforms had 
been implemented on too broad a scale and without proper planning. Particularly in times 
of economic reforms involving an expansion of the private sector, they argued, it was es-
sential to defend the power monopoly of the Communist Party all the more resolutely. 
3. Declarations by the party and state leaderships of both countries repeatedly stress the 
need to learn from each other particularly in the key questions of political leadership and 
the exercise of power and thus the importance of continuing and improving the exchange 
of experience. Mutual assurances that each will adhere steadfastly to the established 
political course and take resolute action to counter all attempts at "peaceful evolution" are 
thus by no means mere ideological lip services but an expression of a community of 
interests. For any major crisis in the political system of either country would inevitably 
have adverse repercussions on its neighbor's political stability. 
4. Broad agreement on domestic-policy issues is backed up by an intensification of relations 
at the economic level, too. The two countries have signed more than 20 trade agreements, 
have re-opened their railway links that were cut in 1978, and have simplified cross-border 
travel and customs procedures to facilitate border trade. Accordingly, the volume of bilat-
eral trade has been experiencing significant annual growth rates since 1991. However, 
these positive developments cannot disguise the fact that the trade balance shows a size-
able surplus in favor of China and that in economic terms the two countries exhibit only a 
low degree of complementarity. Also, since Vietnam and China are pursuing virtually 
identical development strategies, they are bound to become embroiled in ever-stiffer com-
petition for economic resources and success on foreign markets. Because of its sheer size 
and also because of its longer experience with reform policy prior to Vietnam's, the PRC 
clearly has a major advantage over Vietnam in this contest. 
5. China's superiority is already having extremely negative effects on economic 
development in northern Vietnam. Large-scale smuggling with an estimated volume of 
US $ 500 million is causing a twofold detriment to Vietnam: illegal exports of 
agricultural products to China are losing it foreign currency that it urgently needs for its 
economy, and in return it is getting cheap consumer products from China that are driving 
many newly-founded Vietnamese company into bankruptcy because they are unable to 
produce the same products as cheaply. Thus, a further expansion of economic relations is 
much less advantageous to Vietnam than it is to China. If Vietnam nevertheless seeks to 
intensify economic relations, this is less for economic than for political reasons. 
6. The most spectacular cause of contention between China and Vietnam at present is their 
conflicting territorial claims in the South China Sea, positions which show no signs of 
converging despite years and various rounds of negotiation. The main reason for this is 
probably that the regions concerned are of both economic and strategic importance. Also, 
this territorial dispute is a question of national honor not only for the leaderships of the 
two countries but also for broad sections of their populaces. Since both in China and in 
Vietnam the powers that be are trying to make up for the loss of face suffered by their so-
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cialist ideology by resorting to nationalist values and slogans, this dimension of the con-
flict harbors incalculable explosive potential. 
7. The preceding analysis of the political and economic relations and the territorial disputes 
between Vietnam and China does not identify any clear-cut conflict constellations nor any 
adequate similarity of interests that would make it possible to rule out major conflicts in 
the near future. On the other hand, there is little sign of the preconditions that would lead 
to the large-scale military clash in the South China Sea that some observers are 
predicting. 
8. There is much to indicate that China is pursuing two objectives with regard to Vietnam 
that are almost incompatible with each other. On the one hand, Peking is seeking to ex-
pand its control over the South China Sea step by step and to realize its territorial claims 
in the long term; on the other hand it wants to avoid an open conflict with Vietnam and to 
maintain a peaceful environment in Southeast Asia, as this is essential to China's own 
continuing economic development. 
9. In order to achieve these goals, Peking has developed a twofold strategy, combining 
offers of talks with threats of the use of force and confronting Vietnam with faits 
accomplis. By leaving Vietnam and the other states in Southeast Asia in the dark about its 
concrete territorial claims, its intentions and its future courses of action, by sending out 
the most diverse signals, and by constantly revising its standpoints in negotiations, Peking 
aims to achieve two things: it is constantly putting the solidarity between Vietnam and the 
other ASEAN members to new tests, and on the other hand its seemingly contradictory 
behaviour instigates heated discussions and quarrels within Vietnam and the other 
ASEAN states as to China's real intentions and how to take appropriate counteraction, 
ultimately weakening the opposite side. 
10. Over the past twenty years, Vietnam has learned from experience that it cannot push 
through its interests vis-à-vis China by pursuing a confrontation strategy but only in a 
long-term and steadfast negotiation process. But such a dialog with an immensely 
stronger partner can only achieve the desired results if Vietnam succeeds in adding 
stronger or extra weight to its own position. Besides seeking to engage in broader 
international economic cooperation with the aim of tying other countries' economic 
interests to Vietnam, Hanoi's sets great store by promoting stronger political cooperation 
between the ASEAN nations. It is also making every effort to cement its relations with its 
dialog partners in ASEAN, the EU, Japan, Russia and not least the US, and to extend 
those relations to the field of security policy. Precisely this initiative has suffered a series 
of setbacks, however, since some members of the top-level Vietnamese leadership are 
obviously still finding it difficult to relinquish inveterate hostilities. But precisely this is 
going to be an imperative if Vietnam wants to arrive at an acceptable harmonization of 
interests with China. 
 
